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In the seventeen years from 1973 to 1990, approximately 400
United States citizens, members of a small, obscure religious cult
known as the Original African Hebrew Israelite Nation of Jerusalem
(formerly Black Hebrews), or, more commonly, the Hebrew Israelite
Community (hereinafter Community), renounced their United
States nationality in Israel. Most, if not all, of this unusually large
class of renunciants surrendered their United States citizenship at
the behest of the leadership of the Community. Fifteen members of
this group successfully appealed to the Board of Appellate Review of
the Department of State from the Department's decision that they
expatriated themselves. Most of the rest have had their citizenship
restored by the Department of State pursuant to a policy decision
which recognized the inherently involuntary character of renuncia-
tions made at the behest of the leadership of the Community.
To understand why so many United States citizens surrendered
their United States nationality "with seeming docility, it is important
to begin with an inquiry into the nature of the Community.'
* Chairman, Board of Appellate Review, Department of State, since 1982. The
opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Department of State or members of the Board.
1. A now defunct English language paper published in Israel gave this background
of the Hebrew Israelites:
As early as World War One, a movement had developed of American Blacks
who considered themselves Israelites. Negroes and Jews probably first came
into contact when Eastern European Jews, fresh off the boat, ended up in the
same New York neighborhoods with southern Blacks who had moved north for
shelter. By the early 1920s, some eight or nine Jewish synagogues had sprung
up in Harlem. But then, as now, the stronghold of Black Judaism was Chicago,
I. ANATOMY OF A CULT
The first members of the Hebrew Israelite Community arrived in
Israel about twenty years ago. They were led by Ben Ami Carter, a
foundry worker from Chicago who reportedly had a vision in 1966
that he should lead an exodus of Black Jews to Israel to establish a
Kingdom of God. Because Israel is the Promised Land to Hebrew
Israelites, who trace their ancestry to the original twelve tribes of
Israel, the first members of the Community believed that black Jews
could escape oppression in the United States and find salvation in
Israel.
Ben Ami Carter, reportedly a man of some charisma and regarded
as a black Moses by some of his followers, established the principal
seat of the Community in Dimona, Israel, where most of the 1,500
members live.2 The Community is in the mold of a typical cult: a
group of people who share a common vision and who see themselves
as separate from the rest of the world.' It has attributes shared to a
greater or lesser extent by all such cults: "an authoritarian structure,
the regimentation of followers, renunciation of the world and the be-
lief that adherents alone are gifted with the truth."4
The hierarchy of the Community descends from Carter as "spiri-
tual father" through various "minister" levels (subordinate officials)
to the "souls" at the bottom. Carter has the final say about finances,
marriages, location of residence, division of labor, access to outside
medical help and travel outside the Community. Members live in a
closed, oppressive environment with no private life. They must sur-
render their personal documents to the Community for safekeeping,
and turn over their earnings. In return they receive a small and inad-
equate monthly stipend. There is one central postal address at
Dimona. Members' mail reportedly is censored. It is not uncommon
for the leadership to intercept incoming mail and withhold it from
the addressee. Deviations from the Community's code of discipline
often result in physical punishment of varying degrees of severity.
Men are allowed five wives. Violations of the code of chastity among
women whose husbands are sent abroad by Carter are reportedly
frequent; violators have had their heads shaved. Although there is
where it had been largely a storefront and basement operation since 1925. In
the U.S. today, Black Jews number between 25,000 and 40,000, and are found
in all the major urban centers. Ten thousand live in Chicago, the city from
which the majority of Dimona's Black Hebrews come.
Roberta Elliot, The Black Hebrews, NEwsvIEw, Feb. 14, 1984, at 12.
2. Office of Citizens Consular Services, Hebrew Israelite Community (formerly
Black Hebrews) (April, 1991) (unpublished paper on file in the Office of Citizens Consu-
lar Services of the Department of State) [hereinafter referred to as "OCS/CCS briefing
piper."].
3. W. APPEL, CULTS IN AMERICA: PROGRAMMED FOR PARADISE 4 (1983).
4. Id. at 17.
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limited health care competence within the Community, Carter has
often refused to allow members access to outside medical assistance,
on occasion with tragic results. Not surprisingly, mental illness is a
problem.
The essential appeal of a cult lies in the way it simplifies life for
its members.
[A cult] promises to provide, and indeed does provide for the convinced
convert, the assurance and absolutism the large society so conspicuously
lacks. Once the initial decision is taken - to join - the rest comes ready-
made: what is right, what is wrong, who shall be saved and who not, how to
eat, how to dress, how to live.5
What the Hebrew Israelite Community cult offers its members and
what it demands of them was vividly described by one disillusioned
renunciant who left the Community and later took an appeal to the
Board of Appellate Review.
In 1973, I was working ... in Detroit, Michigan. I had just begun going
through a divorce from my wife and was emotionally upset. At this time,
one of my friends from work invited me to a dinner at his home, where I
could meet some new people. At the dinner, I was surrounded by members
of a group known as the Original Hebrew Israelite Nation of Jerusalem.
They were extremely supportive of me emotionally and drew me to them.
They spoke about America being destroyed by nuclear war, using passages
from the Bible, and created a fear about remaining in the United States.
I was drawn to them because of the great comfort they provided me.
They seemed to believe that my problems were not my fault, that I was just
a victim of circumstances. They began to talk with me about their religion.
I began to attend bi-weekly meetings and tried to keep the lifestyle de-
manded by the group leader, Ben-Ami Carter. We were required to fast on
the sabbath, give up liquor, tobacco and meat.
The group began to demand more and more of my time. When I tried to
resist, they would all shun me and tell me to go back to my wife. They had
become such an important part of my life that I felt if they were to shun
me, I would have nowhere to go. The more time I spent with them, the
greater their demands of time and devotion became.
Late in 1973, they told me to prepare to flee the United States. At their
direction, I quit my job. They then instructed me to make purchases for my
new life. I ran up huge bills buying clothing and goods when I had no
means of paying or my purchases. I was directed not to pay any bills and
to turn all of my savings over to the group. I left my apartment and posses-
sions and moved in with the group. They then advised me that the police
were looking for me and that I would have to leave. I was ordered not to
tell my family or friends about leaving, I was just to disappear.
I was given a ticket to Israel by the group. I entered Israel on a tour
composed solely of members of the group. After entering Israel, the whole
tour disappeared into the group's facilities there.
I was given a new identity in Israel. I was ordered not to have any con-
5. C. KRAUSE, GUYANA MASSACRE 118 (1978) (quoting S.P. Hersh & Ann Mac-
Leod, Cults and Youth Today (unpublished material, on file with authors at National
Institute of Mental Health or University of Maryland, respectively)).
tact with my family in the United States. I was shut off from the real world
and drawn more deeply into the world of the group. I was put on a very
limited diet. I could not eat meat or dairy products and lived off of fruits,
grains and dried beans. I was expected to work in the outside community
and turn all of my proceeds over to the group.'
Until recently, the existence and activities of the Community have
been viewed as an irritant to the relations between United States and
Israel. Most members of the Community entered Israel as tourists
and have remained in violation of Israel's immigration laws. In 1972,
the Israeli High Court refused to recognize the Hebrew Israelites as
Jewish and ruled that they did not qualify for Israeli residency or
citizenship under the Law of Return.7 The Israeli government ac-
cordingly refused to issue members of the Community work permits,
thus forcing them either to work illegally or subsist on charitable
contributions and assistance from Israeli social service agencies.
As illegal immigrants, Hebrew Israelites lived under the threat of
deportation to the United States by Israeli authorities, particularly if
they worked on the Israeli economy. Cult members thus were in con-
stant jeopardy of being separated from a way of life which they pre-
sumably found companionable and spiritually elevating. Following
rumors of mass deportations in 1973, a group of about seventy mem-
bers formally renounced their United States citizenship, evidently at
the direction of Ben Ami Carter. Apparently, Carter reasoned that
renunciations would forestall deportation by rendering members
stateless and thus keep his Community intact. Subsequent rumors of
deportations led Carter to order more renunciations. Evidently, the
ploy was effective. When forty-six members of the cult were arrested
in 1986, the Israeli government deported only those members with
United States citizenship. Those who had renounced their citizenship
were released. Over the past fifteen years, slightly over 400 Commu-
nity members have renounced their United States citizenship. How-
ever, for unknown reasons,' not all members of the cult renounced
their citizenship. Possibly many members did not work on the Israeli
economy, but subsisted on charity, and therefore did not risk arrest
for working illegally. Many other members were children.
The renunciation of United States citizenship by so many cult
members attests to Carter's and the Community's effective mind
control over their well-conditioned subjects. It may be assumed that
Carter was able to maintain the conversion of members to the tenets
of the Community by various techniques - prayer, creating fear, in-
6. Affidavit of Michael E.G. at 1-2, In re Michael, 12 Bd. App. Rev. 73 (Dept. of
State, Feb. 13, 1986).
7. By contrast, the Israeli government acknowledges the Black Falashas of Ethio-
pia as co-religionists and has welcomed them to settle in Israel. In 1990, the press re-
ported extensively on the airlift of Falashas. from Ethiopia to Israel where they were
welcomed as Jews.
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stilling feelings of guilt - which prolonged the dissociated condition
produced by those tactics. The intensity and prolongation of these
techniques made it possible for him to possess an extreme degree of
control over the minds of members.' "Brainwashing" is the collo-
quial term to describe the effect of Carter's control over his follow-
ers.9 It is not difficult to accept that as a consequence of effective
brainwashing, Carter's followers were unable to make voluntary,
considered judgments when ordered to renounce United States
citizenship.
Members of the Hebrew Israelite Community who renounced
their citizenship are exemplars of the proposition that "human be-
ings may be innately susceptible to certain persuasive techniques." 10
Carter succeeded in convincing so many of his flock to renounce citi-
zenship because he was a charismatic leader, able to inculcate fear
of the consequences of disobedience in members of the sect who, for
the most part, were artless, ill-educated and pre-disposed to abnega-
tion. Carter's comminations thus probably seemed quite real to
them. Furthermore, the controlled environment Carter created in the
isolation of Dimona intensified the herd instinct in his followers.
II. How FORMAL RENUNCIATION OF NATIONALITY IS
ACCOMPLISHED
The Immigration and Nationality Act prescribes expatriation as a
consequence of making a formal renunciation of one's nationality
before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a for-
eign state, in the form prescribed by the Secretary of State."1 Pro-
8. W. APPEL, supra note 3, at 163.
9. "[Brainwashing] does not necessarily imply robot-like behavior, but rather,
dramatically altered behavior. As parents and psychiatrists have observed, cult members
are changed from their former selves. Their behavior is typically flat, passive, without
humor or vitality. They have difficulty concentrating and are at a loss when asked to
make independent judgments or decisions." Id. at 164.
10. C. KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 119 (quoting from W. SARGANT, BATTLE FOR THE
MIND; W. SARGANT, THE MIND POSSESSED).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act § 349(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1988),
provides that:
Sec. 349. (a) A person who is a national of the United States whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any
one of the following acts with the intention of relinquishing United States na-
tionality -
(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or con-
sular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of State ....
vided the prospective renunciant is competent and acts voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently, no diplomatic or consular office may
deny one the right to expatriate himself or herself. It has been the
law for more than a century that expatriation is "a natural and in-
herent right of all people" and anything done or said by any United
States official which might deny that right is "inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of the Republic.
12
Since formal renunciation of United States citizenship is an act
fraught with grave consequences, the Department of State has de-
vised procedures to better ensure that there is no reasonable doubt
that the renunciation was done voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently. 13 Consular officers are to counsel prospective renunciants
about the serious consequences of renunciation and to advise them to
reflect carefully before proceeding. Once it is clear that the individ-
ual is determined to renounce, he or she is asked to execute, in the
presence of the officer and two witnesses, a sworn statement of un-
derstanding of the consequences of the act. In particular, the individ-
ual is asked to acknowledge that renunciation is a right which the
person x'vishes to exercise and freely does so, that the act will leave
the person an alien toward the United States, and that the ramifica-
tions of renunciation have been carefully explained to the person and
he or she fully understands them. Only then does the officer adminis-
ter the oath of renunciation. The form of oath prescribed by the Sec-
retary of State reads as follows:
... I desire to make a formal renunciation of my American nationality, as
provided by section 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and
pursuant thereto I hereby absolutely and entirely, without mental reserva-
tion, coercion or duress, renounce my United States nationality together
with all rights and privileges and all duties of allegiance and fidelity there-
unto pertaining.
Recognizing that the circumstances involved in renunciation by
12. Revised Statutes of the United States § 1999 (originally enacted as Act of July
27, 1868, ch. 249, § 1, 15 Stat, 223), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1481 at 1384, and in 8
U.S.C.A. § 1481 at 225. Revised Statutes of the United States § 1999, also known as the
Right of Expatriation, reads as follows:
Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people,
indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this principle this Government has
freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of
citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their
descendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments
thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that
this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed:
Therefore any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officer
of the United States which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of
expatriation, is declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the
Republic.
13. 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 1251-53 (1984) (prescribes the procedures for
formal renunciation of nationality).
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Hebrew Israelites were unusual in that most were probably advised,
if not ordered, to give up their citizenship, the Department of State,
in an attempt to ensure that the renunciations were voluntary, re-
quired from the outset that consular authorities in Israel ask renun-
ciants to complete an additional affidavit supplementing the state-
ment of understanding. In September, 1973, the Department of
State sent the following instruction to the Embassy in Tel Aviv re-
garding use of the supplemental affidavit.
In view of the circumstances involved, embassy must make certain that
renunciation be voluntary and not performed under duress, coercion or in-
fluence. Request Black Hebrews who wish to renounce to answer following
questions in supplemental affidavit:
1. Have you retained an attorney to represent you in this matter of
renunciation? If not, why not? Do you want additional time to con-
sult with an attorney, friends, or family advisors?
2. Is your decision to renounce in any part based:
(A) On the fact that the GOI [Government of Israel] is consid-
ering deporting you? If so, explain.
(B) On your present financial condition? If so, explain.
(C) On personal or family problems and/or living conditions?
If so, explain.
(D) On influence, force and/or coercion that is being brought
upon you by any person or persons? If so, explain.
If the Consul believes that the renunciant may have any reservations, do
not, repeat, do not administer the oath of renunciation, but send to the De-
partment for decision all documents and a memorandum of conversation in
the event of refusal to sign affidavits. If no reservations are apparent, ad-
minister the oath of renunciation and send all documents to the
Department.
14
Renunciants usually went to the Embassy in groups of four or five,
under escort of an official of the Community. Renunciations were
handled in two stages. During the first stage, the renunciant was
given copies of the oath of renunciation, the statement of under-
standing, and the supplemental affidavit to read. An Embassy em-
ployee explained the procedure and assisted each one as necessary to
complete the forms. During the second stage, the consular officer,
renunciant, and witnesses met privately in a separate office. The con-
sular officer read each question orally to the renunciant, explained
difficult Words, answered any questions, stressed the gravity of the
act, and attempted to ascertain whether the renunciation was volun-
tary or if there was an element of coercion. Signatures on the three
documents were reportedly taken only after the consular officer was
14. Telegram Number 19236 from United States Department of State to Embassy
Tel Aviv (Sept. 26, 1973) (regarding renunciation of U.S. Citizens).
satisfied that the renunciant understood the entire process and acted
freely.15 The similarity of responses to questions posed by consular
officers indicates that there probably was, as all appellants before the
Board asserted, prior coaching in Dimona. Answers to oral questions
'of the consuls were generally given in a monotone. Answers to writ-
ten questions about voluntariness in the supplemental affidavit were
uniformly terse and invariably identical from one renunciant to
another.
It is evident that consular officers followed an elaborate procedure
intended to establish whether the renunciations were voluntary. Per-
haps they could not have done more to ascertain whether the Com-
munity member was indeed acting freely.
In loss of nationality proceedings, there is a statutory legal pre-
sumption that a person who performs a statutory expatriative act
does so voluntarily. The presumption may be rebutted, however,
upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was
not voluntary.16 The statute and case law also provide that in such
proceedings, the government bears the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the actor intended to relinquish citi-
zenship." Where formal renunciation of citizenship is involved, the
dispositive legal issue almost invariably is whether the renunciation
was a free and unfettered act. If it is established that the act was
15. It does not appear that consular officers refused to accept the renunciations of
any Hebrew Israelites. However, a few years ago, two prospective renunciants told a
consular officer that they were reluctant to renounce but feared the consequences if they
did not do so. Both were given copies of their signed oaths of renunciations (presumably
to show the leadership that they had obeyed orders). The documents of one were not sent
to the Department; the other individual in the end, decided to follow through and actu-
ally renounced citizenship. The embassy completed the steps necessary to permit him to
do so.
No general policy was adopted with respect to individuals like the two referred to
above. In any event, after 1989, formal renunciations dropped off sharply. Telegram
Number 03965 from Embassy Tel Aviv to the United States Department of State (Mar.
16, 1988).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1482(b) provides that:
(C) Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any action
or proceeding commenced on or after the enactment of this subsection . . .
under, or by virtue of, the provisions of this or any other Act, the burden shall
be upon the person or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Any person who commits or per-
forms, or who has committed or performed, any act of expatriation under the
provisions of this or any other Act shall be presumed to have done so volunta-
rily, but such presumption may be rebutted upon a showing, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the act or acts committed or performed were not
done voluntarily.
Under the preponderance of the evidence rule, an appellant must establish that the
existence of the contested fact - the claim that he or she was forced to renounce citizen-
ship - is more probable than its non-existence. K. BROUN, G. Dix, E. GELHORN, D. KAYE,
R. MEISENHOLDER, E. ROBERT, J. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (3d ed.
1984).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b). See also Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
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voluntary, it follows almost ineluctably that the government can suc-
ceed in establishing that the citizen intended to relinquish citizen-
ship. By definition, formal renunciation, made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently, bespeaks an unambiguous intent to forfeit
citizenship.'
After the formalities have been completed, the consular officer
concerned is required to execute a Certificate of Loss of United
States Nationality (CLN) in the name of the renunciant.' 9 The
CLN sets forth briefly the essential facts of the case and the section
of law under which loss of nationality is held to have occurred. After
the case has been developed, the CLN and ancillary documents are
forwarded to the Department of State for adjudication.
In none of the Hebrew Israelite cases appealed to the Board of
Appellate Review ("Board") did the Embassy make a substantial
report on the case, or even indicate that the circumstances surround-
ing the particular renunciation had been examined. The Embassy
apparently assumed the Department would accept without elabora-
tion its judgment that the renunciation was voluntary, as attested by
the renunciant's statements. Repeatedly the Embassy forwarded the
CLN and supporting papers to the Department under cover of a
memorandum which stated merely:
Enclosed for the Department's approval is a certificate of Loss of National-
ity which was executed by the Embassy in the case of -, a Black He-
brew, who made a formal renunciation of his U.S. nationality on
The certificate is accompanied by an Oath of Renunciation, a statement of
understanding and an additional Affidavit as requested in reftel.
Mr./Ms. -U.S. passport is also enclosed.
Evidently sharing the judgment of the Embassy, the Department of
State saw no need to look behind any of the renunciations; in none of
18. "A voluntary oath of renunciation is a clear statement of desire to relinquish
United States citizenship ... ." Davis v. District Director, Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service, 481 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.D.C. 1979), afl'd without opinion, 652 F.2d
195 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 942 (1981).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1501 provides:
Whenever a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States has reason to
believe that a person while in a foreign state has lost his United States nation-
ality under any provision of Chapter 3 of this title, or under any provision of
chapter IV of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, he shall certify the
facts upon which such belief is based to the Department of State, in writing,
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State. If the report of the
diplomatic or consular officer is approved by the Secretary of State, a copy of
the certificate shall be forwarded to the Attorney General, for his information,
and the diplomatic or consular office in which the report was made shall be
directed to forward a copy of the certificate to the person to whom it relates.
the cases appealed to the Board, at least, did the Department in-
struct the Embassy to develop the case more thoroughly.
In recent years, the Department of State has made about 800 de-
terminations of loss of nationality annually, of which some 200 are
based on formal renunciation of nationality.20 From 1980 through
1990, ninety-two appeals were taken to the Board of Appellate Re-
view from determination of loss of nationality as a consequence of
formal renunciation of nationality. Fifteen were filed by members of
the Hebrew Israelite Community.
Over the past ten years, the Board held that forty-eight of the
ninety-two cases appealed to it were time-barred and accordingly
dismissed them for want of jurisdiction.2 1 The Board affirmed the
Department's determination of expatriation in twenty and reversed
its determination in sixteen. Seven cases were remanded to the De-
partment at the latter's request to vacate the CLN, the Department
having submitted that it could not carry its burden of proof. One
case was dismissed as moot after the Department informed the
Board that it believed it appropriate to vacate the CLN pursuant to
a new (1990) policy for adjudicating Hebrew Israelite renunciations.
The Hebrew Israelite renunciation cases aside, the Board has, as a
rule, insisted that pleas of coercion be supported by detailed evidence
and that there be a credible showing that the actor had no reasona-
ble or viable alternative to forfeiting United States nationality. For-
mal renunciation of United States nationality being such an explicit,
unambiguous and final expatriative act, the Board believes it fair
and right to accept nothing less.22
Obviously, the Board did not consider that any of the twenty ap-
pellants, whose loss of nationality it affirmed, met its criteria to
prove duress. Interestingly, in only one of those twenty cases did an
20. Telegram 121931 from United States Department of State to all Diplomatic
Consular Posts (Apr. 16, 1990) (on file with Department of State Board of Appellate
Review, rec'd May 4, 1990).
21. The fact that the Board has determined that the appeal is time-barred and has
dismissed it on the grounds that it lacks jurisdiction does not in itself bar the Department
of State from taking further administrative action. Leich, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 298, 302 (No. 2, Apr.
1983) (quoting David R. Robinson, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in his
memorandum to the Board of Appellate Review):
[Wlhere the Board of Appellate Review has dismissed an appeal in a citizen-
ship case as time barred, that fact standing alone does not preclude the Depart-
ment from taking further administrative action to vacate a holding of loss of
nationality. This continuing jurisdiction should be exercised, however, only
under certain limited conditions to correct manifest errors of law or fact, where
the circumstances favoring reconsideration clearly outweigh the normal inter-
ests in the repose, stability and finality of prior decisions.
Id.
22. In re Tibor S., 12 Bd. App. Rev. 53 (Dept. of State, Jan. 23, 1986) (illustrative
of the Board's general approach, particularly where, as in In re Tibor S., economic du-
ress is pleaded).
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appellant plead that she gave up her American citizenship as a result
of the influence of another. 8 With respect to the sixteen whose loss
of nationality the Board reversed, only one pleaded that he re-
nounced because of the influence of another - his father. In that case
the appellant was sixteen years old when he renounced his citizen-
ship. His father, a devout Muslim, had reared his son to obey him
without demur as prescribed by Islamic law.24 In the Board's view,
the appellant made a persuasive case that he had renounced only to
obey his father. The others whose loss of nationality the Board re-
versed were adjudged incompetent to perform the act, had not know-
ingly or intelligently renounced, or performed an act of renunciation
that the Board deemed invalid.
The Hebrew Israelite renunciation cases thus presented the Board
with novel issues of fact. They were the first appeals the Board heard
involving multiple renunciations which were part of an unmistakable
common pattern.
III. HEBREW ISRAELITE COMMUNITY RENUNCIATIONS BEGIN TO
TURN TO THE BOARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW FOR RELIEF
Not until 1980 did any one of the many Black Hebrews who had
renounced citizenship seek appellate review of the Department's de-
termination of loss of his or her citizenship. By 1980, Michael E.G.,
who renounced his citizenship in 1974 (one of the first to do so) had
become disillusioned with the Community. Although he was still liv-
ing at Dimona, he approached the Embassy in confidence to express
the wish to cancel his renunciation. His request was referred to the
Board, whose Chairman wrote him in August 1980 to explain how to
file a proper appeal. Fearing the repercussions if the leadership were
to learn that he was trying to recover his citizenship, Michael had
asked the Embassy not to forward any reply from Washington to
him at Dimona, but rather, to hold it for him to pick up. However,
the Embassy apparently did not do as he requested. Instead, it alleg-
edly sent the letter to the Community's central postal address in
Dimona where it probably was intercepted by the leadership and
withheld from Michael. Michael maintained that the interception
was the reason he never received the Board's letter. Allegedly not
knowing how to do so, he made no further attempt to obtain review
23. In re Elizabeth M. V., 6 Bd. App. Rev. 112 (Dept. of State, Aug. 25, 1982)
(appellant claimed that her husband exerted influence over her).
24. In re Hussam H.L., 11 Bd. App. Rev. 55 (Dept. of State, Aug. 8, 1985).
of his case until he broke with the Community and returned to the
United States. He then obtained counsel and filed a proper appeal in
1985.25
Michael E.G. asserted that he renounced his citizenship under co-
ercion and duress. The Community exercised such a strong psycho-
logical hold on him that he lacked the requisite mental state to relin-
quish citizenship voluntarily, thus performing the act without
comprehending its consequences.
The Board did not reach the merits of Michael E.G.'s appeal. It
concluded that the appeal was time-barred and dismissed it for lack
of jurisdiction.26 The Department of State thereafter vacated the
certificate of loss of nationality on the grounds that the evidence sub-
mitted by the appellant had overcome the statutory presumption that
he acted voluntarily.
27
Nearly three years passed before other Community renunciants
noted an appeal to the Board. Ina Y.A. and Markham A.I., who
renounced their citizenship in 1986, filed timely appeals in 1987.28 In
neither case did the Department of State file a brief within the time
prescribed by the regulations. The Board therefore decided each ap-
peal solely on the submissions of the appellant. Both Ina Y.A. and
Markham A.I. alleged that they were forced to renounce their citi-
zenship by the Community leadership. To defy Ben Ami Carter, Ina
Y.A. stated, would mean suffering severe consequences. Markham
A.I. stated that to remain in good standing in the Community, one
had no choice but to renounce upon being told to do so. Ina Y.A.
supported her allegations with sworn statements of two persons who
knew her. Markham A.I. submitted only his own uncorroborated
statement. In both cases, the Board concluded, with minimal analy-
sis, that the appellant had not made a credible case of duress and
thus had not rebutted the presumption of voluntariness. Although
the Board held that the renunciations of both Ina Y.A. and Mark-
ham A.I. were voluntary, it reversed the Department of State's hold-
ing of loss of citizenship in both cases on the grounds that the De-
partment of State, having made no submission within the time
allowed, failed to carry, let alone undertake, its statutory burden of
proving that the renunciants intended to relinquish citizenship.
A year later, two more Hebrew Israelite Community renunciants
filed appeals. In the first case, In re Shirley J.P.,28 the Department
25. In re Michael E.G., 12 Bd. App. Rev. 73 (Dept. of State, Feb. 13, 1986).
26. Id. at 82.
27. See Leich, supra note 21, at 302 (regarding the authority of the Department of
State to vacate the CLN after the Board dismissed the appeal).
28. In re Ina Y.A., 16 Bd. App. Rev. 200 (Dept. of State, June 30, 1988); In re
Markham A.I., 16 Bd. App. Rev. 208 (Dept. of State June 20, 1988).
29. In re Shirley J.P., 18 Bd. App. Rev. 247 (Dept. of State, June 30, 1989).
Appellant joined the Hebrew Israelites in the United States in 1978. In 1979, she took
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of State requested that the Board remand the case so that the certifi-
cate of loss of nationality (CLN) might be vacated. The Department
of State based this request on the grounds that it was unable to
prove that Shirley J.P. intended to relinquish her citizenship. The
Board dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, having found it
time-barred. Thereafter, the Department vacated the CLN.30
Ironically, the Second case, In re Lenise P.C., concerned the
daughter of the spiritual leader of the Community who renounced
her citizenship in 1973 when she was fifteen years old.31 The statute
does not specify an age below which formal renunciation of citizen-
ship is not permitted.3 2 However, the statute permits one who re-
nounces citizenship under the age of eighteen to nullify renunciation
upon attaining majority. 3  Department of State guidelines prescribe
an arbitrary limit of age fourteen. Below this age children are held
to be incapable of understanding the consequences of their acts. In
addition, consular officers are instructed to proceed very circum-
spectly in taking the renunciation of a minor over age fourteen and
are to examine exhaustively all evidence to establish whether the act
is being done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 4
In Lenise P.C.'s case, the record showed that the consular officer
followed the prescribed procedure to the letter. He counseled her
about the seriousness of the act, advised her of the legal ramifica-
tions of renunciation by a minor, and explained the provisions of the
law to her. As he reported to the Department:
I spoke to [Lenise P.C.] privately and she struck me as being relatively
mature. She seemed to be cognizant of the effect of her contemplated act.
[Lenise P.C.] stated at the time that she had not been coerced or pressured
her two children with her to Israel and began life in the Community at Dimona. At age
22, she renounced her citizenship, allegedly under pressure from Ben Ami Carter.
30. See supra note 21.
31. In re Lenise P.C., 19 Bd. App. Rev. 1, 2 (Dept. of State, July 5, 1989). Appel-
lant's father took her to Israel when she was 12 years old, apparently without her
mother's agreement that she might live there with him. At age 15, she renounced her
citizenship, under pressure of her father, as she alleged to the Board.
32. The Nationality Act of 1940 § 403(b), 8 U.S.C. § 803 (1940) (repealed 1952)
(provided that no person under the age of 18 might expatriate himself by performing any
statutory expatriative act). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §
1481 (1989), has no express provisions regarding the age above which a citizen may
make a formal renunciation of citizenship. However, section 351(b) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1483 (1988), provides that a person who re-
nounced citizenship prior to his or her 18th birthday shall not be deemed to have expatri-
ated himself or herself if within six months of attaining the age of 18, he or she asserts a
claim thereto in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of State.
33. Immigration and Nationality Act § 351(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1483 (1988).
34. 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 1254.1 (1984).
into making her decision by her father or any other members of the Black
Hebrew movement.35
When she returned to the Embassy a few days later, her mind
evidently made up, the officer accepted her renunciation, avowedly
convinced that this fifteen-year-old, with little education, knew what
she was doing and was acting independently of any pressure from
her father, known to all as leader of the sect. 8 The Department of
State, without recording its grounds for doing so, accepted the rec-
ommendation of the consular officer and approved the CLN.37 After
the appeal was filed in 1989, the Department of State viewed the
case from a different perspective, and requested that the Board re-
mand the appeal so that the CLN might be vacated.38 It was the
Department's view that:
[A]t the time of [Lenise P.C.'s] renunciation she was fifteen and a half
years of age, and never understood the ramification of her actions or fully
grasped the seriousness of her renunciation. The Department believes that
appellant was too young to have formed the requisite intent to relinquish
her U.S. citizenship.
39
Having concluded that the appeal was time-barred and that it
lacked jurisdiction to remand, as requested, the Board dismissed the
appeal, observing: "The Board has great sympathy for appellant, and
applauds the Department's decision. . . . Had the appeal been
timely, the Board would have remanded the case with alac-
rity . ,40 After the Board dismissed the appeal, the Department
vacated the CLN 1
IV. EIGHT EARLY APPELLATE DETERMINATIONS
The following year, the Board decided eight appeals, reversing the
Department of State's determination in five and affirming it in
three.42 However, after appellants in the latter three filed motions for
reconsideration, the Board reversed itself and restored citizenship.4 3
35. In re Lenise P.C., 19 Bd. App. Rev. at 2-3 (Dept. of State, July 5, 1989).
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 6.
41. See supra note 21.
42. In re Terri A.H., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 7 (Dept. of State, Jan. 23, 1990); In re
Michael J.S., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 41 (Dept. of State, Feb. 2, 1990); In re Velma P.A., 20
Bd. App. Rev. 80 (Dept. of State, Feb. 22, 1990); In re Gwendolyn J.P., 20 Bd. App.
Rev. 118 (Dept. of State, Mar. 22, 1990); In re Marshall T.B., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 219
(Dept. of State, May 15, 1990); In re Nathaniel R.S., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 255 (Dept. of
State, June 25, 1990); In re Anthony G.P., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 268 (Dept. of State, June
28, 1990); and In re Deborah A.B., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 279 (Dept. of State, June 29,
1990).
43. The five cases where the Board reversed the Department's determination of
loss of nationality involved a very young man and four young women. The cases of the
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There was no direct evidence in these cases that the Community
leadership ordered appellants to renounce citizenship. However, the
Board took notice that in the past, the Community reportedly had
directed many members to renounce citizenship in order to frustrate
deportation by the Israeli authorities. Consistent accounts of pres-
sure in previous appeals heard by the Board lent credibility to the
claims of these eight appellants.
Additional factors supported their allegations of duress. In the
past, disobeying the Community leadership has resulted in punish-
ment, often severe. Further, before the renunciants went to the Em-
bassy, they were unquestionably rehearsed by a Community leader.
The most blatant evidence of influence is the fact that a Community
leader invariably accompanied the renunciants to the Embassy,
waited while they renounced citizenship, and afterwards escorted
them back to the Community's compound."
V. GUIDING PRECEPTS
In deciding these appeals, the Board was guided by certain well-
established legal principles. For example, it was well-established that
"the right of citizenship being an important civil one can only be
waived as the result of free and intelligent choice."45 It had also been
determined that a voluntary act is one "proceeding from one's own
choice or full consent unimpelled by another's influence. To deter-
mine whether an act is voluntary, the trier of fact must examine all
relevant facts and circumstances which might cause the actor to de-
part from the exercise of free choice and respond to compulsion from
others. 46
The Board was also mindful of Justice Frankfurter's injunction in
young man, In re Michael J.S., and one of the young women, In're Gwendolyn J.P., are
illustrative. In re Michael J.S., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 41 (Dept. of State, Feb. 2, 1990), In re
Gwendolyn J.P., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 118 (Dept. of State, Mar. 22, 1990). The other cases
involved older men; In re Michael T.B. is representative. In re Marshall T.B., 20 Bd.
App. Rev. 219 (Dept. of State, May 15, 1990).
44. In response to an inquiry of the Board of Appellate Review, the Embassy at
Tel Aviv reported that "since 1985, a HIC [Hebrew Israelite Community] official has
escorted all prospective renunciants." Telegram No. 10597 from the Embassy at Tel
Aviv to United States Dept. of State (July 28, 1989).
45. Yuichi Inouye v. Clark, 73 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (S.D. Cal. 1947), rev'd on
procedural grounds, Clark v. Inouye, 175 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1949).
46. Kasumi Nakashima v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 11, 12 (S.D. Cal. 1951). See also
Akio Kuwahara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 38, 43 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (held: "[T]he trier of
fact must consider all evidence relating to the mental condition of the actor to determine
whether this act was 'unimpelled by another's influence.' ").
Nishikaw v. Dulles:4  "[w]here a person who has been declared ex-
patriated contests that declaration on grounds of duress, the evidence
in support of this claim must be sympathetically scrutinized. This is
so both because of the extreme gravity of being denationalized and
because of the subtle, psychologic factors that bear on duress."' 8 In
all eight cases, because the psychological factors were important, the
Board attempted to give them close scrutiny.
The Board saw similarities between the cases of these eight appel-
lants and the cases of the dual United States - Japanese citizens who
renounced American citizenship in the United States during World
War II. "9 Tadayasu Abo v. Clark5" seemed apposite. There, the citi-
zenship-claimants alleged that they renounced due to duress and co-
ercion exerted by disloyal internees at the infamous Tule Lake in-
ternment camp.51 They also alleged that alien parents pressured
their children to renounce United States citizenship in order to pre-
vent family break-up and avoid draft induction. 2 In Tadayasu Abo,
the parties agreed that a combination of factors led to the citizenship
renunciations at-Tule Lake camp. Such factors included threats and
the notoriously bad camp conditions.5" What disagreement there
was, the court stated, concerned which factors were primary, and
which subordinate, and as to the effect and impact upon the citizen-
ship-claimants. In holding that citizenship should be restored, the
court declared that: "[s]uch factors, singly or in combination, cast
the taint of incompetency upon any act of renunciation made under
their influence by American citizens interned without Constitutional
sanction, as were plaintiffs." 4
VI. THE BOARD'S DECISIONAL RATIONALE
The appellant in In re Michael J.S. 15 was only twenty years old
when he renounced his citizenship.56 Taken to Israel by his mother
when he was seven years old, he was reared and educated in the
47. 356 U.S. 129 (1958) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
48. Id. at 140.
49. The Nationality Act of 1940, § 401(i), 8 U.S.C. § 801(i)(1940) (repealed
1952), provided for loss of citizenship as a result of formal renunciation in the United
States in wartime in such form and before such officer as the Attorney General should
designate. Section 349(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 §
349(a)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6) (1988), has a similar provision.
50. 77 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Cal. 1948), affid, rev'd and amended in part, 186 F.2d
766 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 832 (1951).
51. Id. at 806.
52. Id. at 808.
53. Id.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. In re Michael J.S., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 41 (Dept. of State, Feb. 2 1990).
56. Id. at 41.
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Community." He submitted thht living in the Community for so
many years had "programmed" him to do whatever the other mem-
bers did .5 He felt completely under the influence of the Hebrew Is-
raelite Community and was afraid to disregard their rules and regu-
lations.5 9 The backdrop against which Michael S. renounced his
citizenship was of paramount relevance to the issue of voluntari-
ness.60 Given the nature of the Community, the Board did not con-
sider it speculative to believe that appellant's fears and concerns
were genuine.61 Through no fault of his own, he found himself in a
bizarre world.62 The Board reasoned that someone so conditioned to
give obedience to his superiors was not likely to resist the commands
of authority, adding that "[f]eebleness on one side and overpowering
strength on the other imply duress. ' 3
Gwendolyn J.P. was thirty years old when she renounced her citi-
zenship in 1986.64 She joined the Hebrew Israelite Community in
1979 and married a fellow member. They had two children.65 Ac-
cording to Gvendolyn J.P., she had been made to believe that the
Community was "the establishment on earth of the Kingdom of
God." 6 In 1986 when the Israeli government deported a number of
Hebrew Israelite Community members, she was instructed, along
with a number of others, to renounce her citizenship to prevent de-
portation. 67 "All 'loyal' members" were expected to obey the com-
mand to renounce.68 In rebuttal of the presumption that she acted
voluntarily, appellant asserted that the leadership convinced her that
renunciation was the only way she could ensure that she would not
be deported, and thus be separated from her children and husband.
Apparently, her husband was not willing to leave the Hebrew Israe-
lite Community at that time and would not allow appellant to re-
move their children from the Community.69 She claimed her hus-
band threatened her life if she attempted to take the children.
70
57. Id.
58. Id. at 46.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id. at 52.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 52 (quoting Yuichi Inouye, 73 F. Supp. at 1003).





69. Id. at 125.
70. Id.
In light of the circumstances, the Board concluded that renuncia-
tion plainly was not appellant's freely formulated decision.71 The
Board accepted that the leadership pressured her to renounce and
that she had a genuine fear that she could be deported and separated
from her children.72 All factors considered, it was evident that she
saw no reasonable alternative to renunciation. Here too there was
"feebleness on one side" and "overpowering strength on the other.1
7 3
The Board's approach in the later appeals of three men7 4 focused
on their ages and, in contrast to the cases of Michael J.S. and
Gwendolyn J.P., their putative capacity to defy the Hebrew Israelite
Community leadership without suffering adverse consequences. At
the time of renunciation, the youngest of the three men was thirty
years old; the other two were thirty seven and thirty nine. 0
Marshall T.B. went to Israel in 1977 at age thirty after serving in
the United States Army in Viet Nam.7 6 In 1986, when a number of
Community members were arrested by the Israeli authorities and
held for deportation, the Community leadership allegedly told Mar-
shall T.B. that the only way he could avoid the same fate was to
renounce his citizenship.77
Marshall T.B. claimed he acted under duress: "I was in fact pres-
sured/coerced under threat of reprisals by the leadership of the
Black Hebrew Community to renounce my U.S. citizenship. '78 He
pointed out that the Hebrew Israelite Community was rigidly con-
trolled,79 and likened the living conditions to those in Iran under the
Ayatollah Khomeini.80 "If he had not renounced his citizenship as
directed, 'it would have been tantamount to being exiled from the
Community.' "81 In particular, he feared if he did not renounce, as
instructed, he would be deported, as many Community members had
already been.82 Appellant claimed he had seen many families in the
Community destroyed when deportation had separated either the fa-
ther or mother from the family. His main concern was the fate of his
71. Id. at 133.
72. Id. at 132.
73. Id. at 133 (quoting Yuichi Inouye, 73 F. Supp. at 1003).
74. In re Anthony G.P., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 268 (Dept. of State, June 28, 1990)
(appellant was 30 years old at renunciation); In re Nathaniel R.S., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 255
(Dept. of State, June 25, 1990) (appellant was 37 years old when he renounced); and In
re Marshall T.B., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 219 (Dept. of State, May 15, 1990) (appellant was
39 years of age at the relevant time).
75. See supra note 74.
76. In re Marshall T.B., 20 Bd. App. Rev. at 219 (Dept. of State, May 15, 1990).
77. Id. at 220.
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family.83
The Board accepted that Marshall T.B. probably had been di-
rected to renounce, had been coached on how to act and speak, and
had gone to the Embassy under escort.84 Weighing against Marshall
T.B.'s claims of duress and coercion were the two statements he
signed declaring that his renunciation was voluntary.85 However, al-
though those statements were important, they were not dispositive.
The Board weighed the statements against "all the relevant facts
and circumstances in the cases that bear on the issue of
voluntariness." 88
The Board saw its task as determining whether the quantum of
influence brought to bear on Marshall T.B. was sufficient to render
his act involuntary. 87 This determination entailed making a judg-
ment whether Marshall T.B. had a reasonable alternative to relin-
quishing his citizenship.8 The Board concluded that despite the fact
that Marshall T.B. was probably ordered to renounce his citizenship,
he did not confront a situation where he was left with no choice.8"
The Board noted that he was nearly forty years old when he re-
nounced and was a decorated veteran."0 Continuing, the Board
reasoned:
Presumptively, appellant was a person of more than average courage, expe-
rience and resourcefulness. Thus, the situation in which he found himself in
1986 was stronger and therefore patently different from those of several
other Black Hebrews (a very young man and several young women) whose
appeals we have heard and decided in their favor.
Futhermore, there is no evidence that appellant would have been physically
abused or restrained if he had tried to remove himself and his wife and
children from the confines of the Community. What apparently constrained
appellant from defying the Community leadership was not lack of courage
or capacity to fend for himself and his family, but a perception that because
the Community fulfilled some kind of spiritual or psychological need, being
forced to leave it as punishment for disobedience would be intolerable.
Outside influence there may have been. Appellant's failure to stand up to it,
however, sprang not from his being in a position of weakness vis-a-vis the
Community leadership, but rather from what appears to have been his per-
ception that loss of his citizenship was of lesser import than possible loss of
his rights and privileges as a member of the Community. In short, appellant
has not shown that the pressure to which he says he was subjected was so
83. Id.
84. Id. at 227.




89. Id. at 225.
90. Id.
strong as to negate his freedom of choice.9 1
Having rejected Marshall T.B.'s argument that his renunciation
was involuntary, the Board proceeded to determine whether Mar-
shall T.B. intended to relinquish his citizenship, an issue the govern-
ment bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence. 2
"Formal renunciation of United States citizenship in the manner
mandated by law and in the form prescribed by the Secretary of
State is, on its face, unequivocal and final," the Board stated, citing
the rule that "[a] voluntary oath of renunciation is a clear statement
of desire to relinquish United States citizenship."93 The Board ob-
served that intent to abandon citizenship is inherent in the act, and
the words of the oath of renunciation are unambiguous. 4
The Board's sole inquiry therefore was whether Marshall T.B. ex-
ecuted the oath of renunciation knowingly and intelligently.' The
record showed that Marshall T.B. acted in full consciousness of the
consequences of his act. He signed two statements acknowledging
that he knew what he was doing and knew what the consequences
were.98 Furthermore, he knew that deportation to the United States
could probably be avoided by renouncing his United States national-
ity.9 7 The Board perceived no inadvertence or mistake of law or fact
on Marshall T.B.'s part and therefore affirmed the Department's
holding of expatriation. 8
The Board decided the cases of the other two men on the same
general rationale of In re Marshall T.B., although neither of the
other men had served in the United States Army.99
The last case in the series of eight was decided by the Board in
late June 1990.10
VII. THE DEPARTMENT'S SPECIAL POLICY FOR THE HEBREW
ISRAELITE COMMUNITY
Earlier in the spring of 1990, as a result of negotiations between
the U.S. Embassy and Israeli officials, the Government of Israel
91. Id.
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b).
93. In re Marshall T.B., 20 Bd. App. Rev. at 230 (quoting Davis v. District Di-
rector, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 418 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.D.C. 1979),
affd, 652 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 942 (1981)).





99. In re Nathaniel R.S., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 255 (Dept. of State, June 25, 1990);
In re Anthony G.P., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 268 (Dept. of State, June 28, 1990).
100. In re Deborah A.B., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 279 (Dept. of State, June 29, 1990),
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adopted a new policy toward the Hebrew Israelite Community.
Under the new policy, all Community adults with valid United
States passports would receive status and work permits. 101 Stateless
renunciants of United States citizenship would receive initial status
and work permits, but continued residency was dependent upon such
persons re-acquiring United States citizenship within a six-month
period. 102
The Government of Israel's new policy toward the Hebrew Israe-
lite Community plainly was a watershed in the Community's long
confrontation with the Israeli authorities. Nonetheless, it was appar-
ent that it might be difficult for 400 renunciants to complete the
process incident to the adjudication of their claims to citizenship
within the prescribed six-month period.0 3 Specifically, if appeals
were taken to the Board of Appellate Review, their disposition might
be more time-consuming. Further, there was no assurance that the
Board would restore citizenship in every case, as its disposition of the
eight appeals discussed above showed. Furthermore, the Board must
decide each case on its merits. The Department of State therefore
decided that it would be within its competence to review administra-
tively its determinations of loss of nationality, thus obviating the
need for appeals to the Board. 04
Under the new procedure, individuals who wished to regain citi-
zenship were to execute affidavits setting forth their reasons for hav-
ing renounced citizenship. 10 5 The Department of State would review
the cases under the premise that in all but the most extraordinary
circumstances the renunciations were presumptively involuntary be-
cause of the pervasive climate of coercion within the Community. 0 6
In effect, the Department of State undertook to weigh the renun-
ciants' statements in light of the Department's own knowledge of the
history of the Hebrew Israelite Community and its methods of oper-
ating.10 7 Since adoption of the new policy in June, 1990, the Depart-
ment of State has vacated loss of nationality holdings in over 300
renunciation cases.' 08 No Hebrew Israelites have made formal re-
101. OCS/CCS briefing paper, supra note 2, at 3.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 4.
108. Id. at 5.
nunciations of citizenship since the new policy went into effect. 10
However, the Department of State concluded that it would not be
appropriate to vacate the CLNs issued for Ben Ami Carter and the
other leaders. 1 The Department asked each of the leaders to submit
further affidavits to determine whether they had been pressured to
renounce citizenship."-1 In all cases, the Community leaders con-
ceded that they acted freely. The Department therefore concluded
there was no basis on which to overturn its prior holdings of
expatriation.11 2
Two appeals by Community members remained on the Board's
docket after the Department adopted its new policy of administrative
review. In In re Kemael W., the Board remanded, at the request of
the Department of State, so that the certificate of loss of nationality
might be vacated.11 3 In that appeal, the Department took the posi-
tion that:
In light of recent decisions of the Board, ruling on this same issue in paral-
lel cases, the Department judges that appellant has rebutted the legal pre-
sumption that section 349(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, as amended, (INA), that his renunciation of U.S. citizenship was vol-
untary. Viewing Mr. [W.]'s appeal in light of these recent Board decisions,
the Department has concluded that appellant has shown by those standards
that it is more probable than not that his renunciation of U.S. citizenship
was impelled by the influence of the BHC [Black Hebrew Community] and
his mother as a BHC member, that he had no reasonable alternative to
renunciation .... 114
The Board dismissed the second appeal as moot after the Depart-
ment informed the Board it believed the CLN should be vacated.
VIII. THE BOARD REVIsITs THREE DECISIONS
After the Department enunciated its new policy, the Board devel-
oped reservations about its past rulings concerning the three men
and their loss of nationality. 11 5 Accordingly, the Board decided to
invite them to move for reconsideration of the Board's decisions.' 1 6
109. Id. at 3.
110. Letter from R. Bevins, OCS/CCS, to Alan G. James, Chairman of the Board
of Appellate Review (Aug. 20, 1991) (discussing Hebrew Israelite Community).
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. In re Kemael W., 21 Bd. App. Rev. 44 (Dept. of State, July 12, 1990).
114. Id. at 46-47.
115. In re Marshall T.B., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 219 (Dept. of State, May 15, 1990); In
re Nathaniel R.S., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 255 (Dept. of State, June 25, 1990); and In re
Anthony G.P., 20 Bd. App. Rev. 268 (Dept. of State, June 28, 1990).
116. The Chairman's letter of July 27, 1990 to each of the three men reads in part
as follows:
The Department of State has recently made a policy decision affecting the han-
dling of the cases of members of the Black Hebrew Community in Israel who
have made a formal renunciation of their United States nationality. Such per-
sons may, upon making a satisfactory statement of their reasons for believing
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The three duly submitted motions for reconsideration. In re Mar-
shall T.B. is illustrative of the Board's disposition of the three mo-
tions.1'" Appellant argued that the Board had not fully appreciated
the nature of the'duress to which he was subjected.11 8 He credibly
detailed the nature of the pressure exerted on him, stressing his fear
of deportation and separation from his family.1 19 The Department of
State did not file a memorandum in opposition. Instead, it urged the
Board to take notice that since adoption of the new policy, holdings
of loss of nationality had been reversed in a large number of cases. 2 °
It also urged the Board to take into consideration the environment of
the Community which, in the Department's view, raised doubts
whether a free choice was possible.1
2'
The Board saw no need to analyze Marshall T.B.'s case in ex-
tenso. It stated simply:
We find the Department's position - the environment of the Community at
Dimona is not conducive to permit a free, unfettered and rational choice to
renounce American citizenship - persuasive. Upon further review of the rec-
ord and reconsideration, we are now unable to conclude that appellant's
formal renunciation was wholly without taint of coercion: In our opinion, a
renunciation procured by pressure, even pressure exerted on a presump-
tively strong, resourceful person cannot stand as a matter of law.1
22
On the same rationale, the Board reversed its prior decisions af-
firming the Department's holding of loss of nationality in the other
two cases.'23
that they were coerced to renounce their nationality have their loss of national-
ity cases reviewed administratively by the Department, without making a for-
mal appeal to this Board. Your case does not qualify for such review since the
Board's decision on your appeal' is final within the Department. However, in
light of the Department's new policy, the Board considers it fair that you be
given an opportunity to have your case reviewed by the Board. Accordingly,
this letter is sent to advise you that the Board is prepared to entertain a motion
for reconsideration of its decision on your appeal.
In re Marshall T.B., 21 Bd. App. Rev. 132, 134 (Dec. 20, 1990) (motion for
reconsideration).
117. Id. at 132.




122. Id. at 135.
123. In re Anthony G.P., 21 Bd. App. Rev. 136 (Dept. of State, Dec. 20, 1990); In
re Nathaniel R.S., 21 Bd. App. Rev. 140 (Dept. of State, Dec. 20, 1990).
IX. CONCLUSION
The Department's special policy and procedures to facilitate resto-
ration of citizenship to interested Hebrew Israelite renunciants is a
welcome development. Pressure by the Community leadership to re-
nounce citizenship, whether intense or nominal, whether there were
alternatives or not, is ipsofacto coercion. United States citizenship is
a right of such inestimable value that one should not be permitted to
waive it under a cloud.
Still, the question arises: why did the Department of State, which
now regards most of the Hebrew Israelite renunciations as tainted,
not so regard them years earlier? While the circumstances of the
Hebrew Israelites and the Japanese Americans who renounced citi-
zenship at the infamous Tule Lake interment camp differ in obvious
respects, the observation of the court in Tadayasu Abo v. Clark 124 is
not inapposite to the renunciations considered here.
[T]he Government was fully aware of the coercion by pro-Japanese organi-
zations and the fear, anxiety, hopelessness and despair of the renunciants;
and yet accepted the renunciations. Any one of the various factors, the exis-
tence of which is admitted by the affidavits, was adequate to produce, at
least, a confused state of mind on the part of the renunciants and in which
considered decision became impossible. 
22
Likewise, from the first, the Department of State had facts which
suggested questions about the spontaneity of Hebrew Israelites' re-
nunciations. Indeed, the Department of State designed the supple-
mental affidavit precisely because it suspected the renunciations
might be influenced by the Hebrew Israelite Community leader-
ship.126 The records of the cases appealed to the Board offer no ex-
planation why the Department of State approved CLNs issued in the
names of Black Hebrews. Perhaps, the consular and departmental
officers concerned were indiscriminatingly deferential to the prescrip-
tion that expatriation is a natural and inherent right and that any-
thing that denies, restricts or questions that right is inconsistent with
the fundamental principles of the Republic. Perhaps, too, the officials
involved were too easily satisfied that the renunciations were volun-
tary; maybe they did not consider probing more deeply into volunta-
riness simply because the renunciants readily attested to the volunta-
riness of the act. Whatever the reasons, it is safe to assume that in
the future the Department of State will subject all the evidence of a
cult member's renunciation to rigorous examination before deeming
the renunciation to be expressive of the free will of the citizen.
The Hebrew Israelite renunciations have also been instructive for
124. 77 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Cal. 1948) affd, rev'd and amended in part, 186 F.2d
766 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 832 (1951).
125. 77 F. Supp. at 811.
126. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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the Board of Appellate Review. When the Board initially heard the
appeals of Marshall T.B. and the two men similarly situated, it gave
relatively little consideration to the environment in which they acted.
Arguably, these men had alternatives to renunciation; clearly they
were better able to stand up to the Community leadership than the
young women and young men whose appeals the Board decided fa-
vorably. Yet, that approach begged the question. The salient consid-
eration was the fact that the three men were pressed to renounce
their citizenship; btbsent such pressure, it is doubtful they would have
surrendered their citizenship. In the particular circumstances of their
cases, the Board ought not to have required the three to show lack of
alternatives after it determined that' leaders of the Community
forced them to follow through with an unwanted choice. Their re-
nunciations, like those of their fellow cult members, were tainted ab
initio, and should not have been accepted as considered and volun-
tary decisions. Plainly, it was fair and equitable for the Board to
encourage the three to return to the Board for re-examination of
their cases, and, upon reconsideration, to reverse its original
decisions.

